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PRECEDENTIAL 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
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District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
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ARGUED JULY 13, 2011 
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Circuit Judges 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 This appeal presents two questions: first, whether 
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3, requiring the 
filing of a Certificate of Merit in malpractice cases, is 
substantive law that federal courts must apply under Erie v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); and second, if the rule is 
substantive state law, did the Appellant comply?  We answer 
both questions in the affirmative and will, as a result, reverse 
the District Court‟s dismissal of the Appellant‟s complaint 
and remand this matter for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 In this diversity case, Appellant Elizabeth Liggon-
Redding filed suit pro se against Attorney Robert Sugarman, 
alleging that he committed legal malpractice while 
representing her in a medical malpractice case in 
Pennsylvania state court.
1
  In particular, she alleged that her 
                                              
1
 The District Court‟s jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 
1332 (diversity of citizenship).  Our jurisdiction is based on 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court dismissed with 
prejudice Liggon-Redding‟s claims for failure to prosecute or 
to comply with its orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b). We review such an order for an abuse of 
discretion.  Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  Although we defer to the District Court's 
discretion, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in 
limited circumstances and doubts should be resolved in favor 
of reaching a decision on the merits. Id. 
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medical malpractice case was dismissed by the state court 
because Sugarman was negligent in failing to retain an expert.  
Sugarman, also proceeding pro se in the District Court, 
defaulted on the complaint but successfully moved to vacate 
the default, explaining the circumstances that gave rise to it 
and also summarizing his defense to Liggon-Redding‟s claim 
(in essence, that Liggon-Redding‟s subsequent treating 
physician told him that Liggon-Redding‟s previous physician 
had not been negligent, and that he could not locate an expert 
to testify to the contrary).   The District Court then permitted 
him to file an answer. Sugarman died while this case was 
pending in the District Court and his estate was substituted as 
a defendant. 
 
 Pennsylvania law requires a plaintiff to file a 
certificate of merit within 60 days after filing a professional 
negligence complaint.  Liggon-Redding‟s certificate was due 
by January 18, 2008, but she did not file a certificate within 
that time.  Sugarman, however, did not raise that issue either 
in his answer (filed three days before that deadline) or later by 
separate motion.  The District Court entered a routine 
scheduling order on January 24, 2008.  Then, on February 28, 
2008, the District Court sua sponte entered an order directing 
the parties to file briefs regarding Pennsylvania‟s certificate 
of merit requirement.
2
  The order correctly noted that the 
Pennsylvania rules require: 
                                              
2
 Sugarman did not argue below and does not argue on appeal 
that the District Court lacked the authority to grant this 
extension sua sponte. Cf. PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3(d) and Note 
(authorizing extension only on timely motion for good cause 
shown).  In any event, under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff 
may file an untimely certificate of merit as long as she does 
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a certificate of merit signed by the 
attorney or party that either 
 
(1) an appropriate licensed 
professional has supplied a 
written statement that there exists 
a reasonable probability that 
[defendant‟s conduct] fell outside 
acceptable professional standards 
and that such conduct was a cause 
in bringing about the harm, or . . . 
 
(3) expert testimony of an 
appropriate licensed professional 
is unnecessary for prosecution of 
the claim. 
 
PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3(a)(1) & (3) (emphasis added). The order 
also quoted the note to the latter provision, which states: 
In the event that the attorney 
certifies under subdivision (a)(3) 
that an expert is unnecessary for 
prosecution of the claim, in the 
                                                                                                     
so before the defendant files a praecipe for non pros, and 
Liggon-Redding filed all of the relevant documents here 
before Sugarman moved to dismiss her complaint. See Moore 
v. John A. Luchsinger, P.C., 862 A.2d 631, 632-33 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2004) (noting also that the certificate of merit 
requirement is not “self-enforcing”). 
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absence of exceptional 
circumstances the attorney is 
bound by the certification and, 
subsequently, the trial court shall 
preclude the plaintiff from 
presenting testimony by an expert 
on the questions of standard of 
care and causation. 
 
PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3(a)(3), Note. 
 In response to this order, Liggon-Redding filed a 
document entitled “certificate of merit,” in which she stated 
in relevant part: “At the conference when you asked if I 
wanted or needed an expert and I said no, will that be deemed 
under Rule 1042.3 as (3) expert testimony of an appropriate 
licensed professional is unnecessary for prosecution of the 
claim?” The District Court did not directly answer her 
question and, instead, entered a second order on March 27, 
2008, amending its previous order “to allow Plaintiff 45 days 
from the date of this Order to submit a certificate of merit,” 
and again quoting the relevant language of Rule 1042.3.  
Within those 45 days, Liggon-Redding filed two more 
documents.  The first is captioned “motion on certificate of 
merit requirement,” and states in relevant part: “The Plaintiff 
has not failed to comply with this requirement, Once Again, 
„EXPERT TESTIMONY OF AN APPROPRIATE 
PROFESSIONAL IS UNNECESSARY FOR 
PROSECUTION OF THE CLAIM![‟.]” The second 
document is also captioned a “certificate of merit” and states 
in relevant part that “Plaintiff does not know how to comply 
with rule 1042 if stating that, „expert testimony of an 
appropriate licensed professional is unnecessary for 
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prosecution of the claim,‟ does not satisfy the requirement,” 
and that “Plaintiff has satisfied the Certificate of Merit 
Requirement to the best of her knowledge and belief.”  
 
 Thereafter, when Sugarman‟s estate was substituted as 
a defendant, counsel for the estate filed a motion to dismiss 
Liggon-Redding‟s complaint under Rule 41(b) for her 
purported failure to file a certificate of merit.  The District 
Court granted that motion by memorandum and order entered 
October 23, 2008.  In doing so, the District Court wrote that 
Liggon-Redding had “failed to file a Certificate of Merit,” 
and characterized her as “argu[ing] that she does not need a 
Certificate of Merit because she expects to proceed without 
an expert.”  Judge Sanchez rejected that argument because he 
concluded that Liggon-Redding in fact would require expert 
testimony to prove her claim.  The District Court did not 
address why Liggon-Redding‟s filings should not be 
construed as a certificate under Pennsylvania Rule 
1042.3(a)(3) or why, as a matter of Pennsylvania or federal 
law, she was not entitled to proceed under that section of the 
Rule.   
 
II. 
 We begin with the question of whether the 
Pennsylvania rule requiring a certificate of merit is procedural 
or substantive law.  The District Court found Pennsylvania‟s 
certificate of merit requirement to be substantive state law.  
We have never addressed the issue precedentially and asked 
the parties to submit additional briefing on this question.
3
 
                                              
3
 District Courts within this Circuit have long recognized that 
Rule 1042.3 is substantive law and should be applied by 
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  A federal court sitting in diversity must apply state 
substantive law and federal procedural law.  See Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  In Chamberlain v. 
Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158-61 (3d Cir. 2000), we 
summarized the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court and other courts concerning the Erie Rule, and set out a 
three-part test to determine whether a state law is substantive 
or procedural for purposes of compliance with the Erie Rule.  
First, a court must determine whether there is a direct 
collision between a federal rule and the state law or rule that 
the court is being urged to apply.  If there is a direct conflict, 
the federal court must apply the federal rule and reject the 
state rule.  If there is no “direct collision,” then the court 
applies the Erie Rule to determine if state law should be 
applied, by evaluating the second and third prongs of the 
Chamberlain test.  Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 159-161.  In the 
second part of the Chamberlain test, a court must determine 
whether the state law is outcome-determinative and whether 
failure to apply the state law would frustrate the twin aims of 
the Erie Rule to discourage forum shopping and avoid 
inequitable administration of the law.  Third, the court must 
consider whether any countervailing federal interests prevent 
the state law from being applied in federal court. See id.  
  
 The parties point to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
8, 9, 11 and 41(b) as rules that may collide with the 
Pennsylvania Certificate of Merit requirement.  We have also 
independently looked at FED.R.CIV.P. 7.  None of these rules 
                                                                                                     
federal courts sitting in diversity. See, e.g., Schwalm v. 
Allstate Boiler & Const., 2005 WL 1322740 , at *1 (M.D. Pa. 
May 17,  2005); Scaramuzza v. Sciolla, 345 F.Supp.2d 508, 
509-10 (E.D.Pa. 2004).   
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collide with the Pennsylvania certificate of merit requirement.  
We will briefly discuss each rule. 
 
A. 
 Federal Rule 7(b) governs the application to the court 
for an order and requires that any application to the court be 
by motion. Unlike Federal Rule 7(b), Pennsylvania Rule 
1042.3 requires a certificate of merit to be filed within 60 
days after filing a professional negligence claim.  Filing a 
certificate of merit, and applying for an order are clearly 
different and unrelated.  Filing a certificate of merit is not an 
application to the court for an order because, when a plaintiff 
files a certificate, he or she is merely adding to the record and 
not requesting any relief or action by the court. Therefore, 
Federal Rule 7(b) and Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3 do not 
directly collide. 
 
 In Chamberlain, we held that neither FED.R.CIV.P. 8 
nor 9 conflicted with a New Jersey Affidavit of Merit statute.  
See 210 F.3d at 159-60.  The same holds true for the 
Pennsylvania rule.  Federal Rule 8 sets out a requirement that 
a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 
8(a).  In contrast, Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3 does not require 
a plaintiff to set forth any factual averments upon which a 
claim is based.  Instead, the rule requires  that a “written 
statement [must be filed] that there exists a reasonable 
probability” that the defendant‟s care, skill, or knowledge fell 
outside acceptable professional standards.  PA.R.CIV.P. 
1042.3(a)(1).   Further, the attorney‟s signature certifies that 
an “appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written 
statement that there is a basis to conclude that the care, skill, 
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or knowledge exercised or exhibited by the defendant in the 
treatment, practice, or work that is the subject of the 
complaint fell outside acceptable professional standards and 
that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm.”  
Id.  Thus, PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3 was created to ensure that 
professional negligence claims are meritorious, and the 
certificate of merit requirement prevents needless waste of 
judicial time and resources which would otherwise be spent 
on non-meritorious claims.   The Certificate of Merit, 
therefore, does not have any “effect on what is included in the 
pleadings of a case or the specificity thereof. ” Chamberlain, 
210 F.3d at 160.  
 
 Federal Rule 9 does require specificity in pleading 
certain types of claims, but malpractice is not among them.  
See id.  Taken together, these rules “dictate the content of the 
pleadings and the degree of specificity that is required.”  Id.  
As was the case with the New Jersey statute, Pennsylvania 
Rule 1042.3 does not govern the content of pleadings or the 
level of specificity contained therein.  The Pennsylvania 
Certificate of Merit, like its New Jersey counterpart, is not a 
pleading and need not be filed until well after the complaint.   
The Pennsylvania rule does not interfere with the pleading 
standards set forth in Federal Rules 8 and 9.  Therefore, these 
rules can co-exist with the Federal Rules. 
 
 The same is true for Rule 11.  Liggon-Redding argues 
that Rule 11 requires an attorney to sign a pleading, thereby 
attesting that the complaint is meritorious.  See FED.R.CIV.P. 
11(b)(1)-(4).  Pennsylvania‟s Rule 1042.3, she maintains, is 
superfluous because it requires the same thing.  We disagree.  
Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3 requires an additional written 
statement by “an appropriate licensed professional” attesting 
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to a “reasonable probability” that a “licensed professional 
deviated from an acceptable professional standard.”  
PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3.  Additionally, the Pennsylvania 
certificate of merit must be filed within sixty (60) days of the 
filing of the complaint.  Federal Rule 11, in contrast, does not 
require an additional consultation with experts or the filing of 
a separate written statement within sixty (60) days of the 
filing of the complaint.  Indeed, Federal Rule 11 only requires 
consultation with an attorney while the Pennsylvania 
Certificate of Merit Rule 1042.3 requires a written statement 
of an appropriate licensed professional, typically a physician.   
 
 If a plaintiff does not file a certificate of merit pursuant 
to PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3, then PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.6 provides that 
an entry of judgment of non pros may be entered  for failure 
to file the certification.  Conversely, Federal Rule 11 does not 
mandate dismissing a plaintiff's claim for failure to consult 
with an attorney.  Rule 11 does, however, provide for 
discretionary sanctions if the plaintiff violates this Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure.  Dismissing an action under Rule 11, 
however, is a sanction of last resort.  See Doering v. Union 
Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 
1988) (sanctions under Rule 11 only prescribed “in the 
exceptional circumstance where a claim or motion is patently 
unmeritorious or frivolous” (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). This, of course, differs from PA.R.CIV.P. 
1042.6 which requires dismissal. 
 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 can co-exist with 
the Pennsylvania certificate of merit rule because each rule 
controls its own intended area of influence without any  
conflict.  PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3 is not “superfluous” since its 
promulgation was specifically intended to ferret out claims 
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lacking merit in the interest of preserving judicial resources 
and promoting judicial economy.  We therefore hold that 
FED.R.CIV.P. 11 does not conflict with PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3. 
 
 Likewise, Federal Rule 41(b) does not directly collide 
with Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3.  Federal Rule 41(b) governs 
involuntary dismissals. Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3 does not 
address any form of dismissal. The filing of a certificate of 
merit serves an entirely different purpose and contemplates an 
entirely different process than that of moving for an 
involuntary dismissal. Therefore, because filing a certificate 
of merit is different than an involuntary dismissal, we 
conclude that these rules do not directly collide.   
 
B. 
 Having found no direct collision, we proceed to the 
second part of the Chamberlain test which requires us to 
apply traditional Erie principles.  See 210 F.3d at 161.  We 
have no difficulty holding that the failure to apply 
PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3 would be outcome-determinative and that 
such a failure would frustrate the twin aims of the Erie Rule: 
discouraging forum shopping and avoiding inequitable 
administration of the laws.  See Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 
72, 83 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 
U.S. 460, 468 (1965).   
 
 In Pennsylvania state court, a plaintiff‟s failure to 
comply with Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3 permits a defendant to 
file a Praecipe for Entry of Judgment of Non Pros. Dismissing 
a claim or case can certainly determine the outcome of the 
matter.  Indeed, a dismissal is permanently determinative if 
the case is dismissed after the statute of limitations has run.  
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Thus, failing to apply the Pennsylvania rule in a federal action 
where no certificate of merit was filed would “produce a 
different outcome than that mandated in the state 
proceeding.”  Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 161.    
   
 Further, failing to apply Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3 in 
federal court would not serve the “twin aims” of the Erie rule.  
First, such a failure would encourage forum shopping.  As we 
held in Chamberlain, a plaintiff “who [has] been unable to 
secure expert support for their claims and face[s] dismissal 
under the statute in state court may, by filing in federal court, 
be able to survive beyond the pleading stage and secure 
discovery.”  210 F.3d at 161.  Put another way, if PA.R.CIV.P. 
1042.3 is considered procedural, and thus inapplicable in 
federal courts, it would, theoretically, be easier to pursue 
frivolous or meritless professional malpractice cases in 
federal court (without a certificate of merit requirement) in 
diversity and pendent jurisdiction cases, than in Pennsylvania 
state courts (with such a requirement).  Inasmuch as one of 
the purposes of the Erie doctrine is to end discrimination 
against citizens by non-citizens and to discourage forum 
shopping, see Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468, the Pennsylvania rule 
must be applied.   
 
 The second of Erie‟s “twin aims” is likewise satisfied 
by enforcing the Pennsylvania rule in federal court.  The 
failure to apply Pa.R.Civ.P. 1042.3 would result in 
inequitable administration of the law.  Were we not to apply 
the state rule, a defendant in federal court would be forced to 
engage in additional litigation and expense in a non-
meritorious malpractice suit simply because the plaintiff was 
from a different state.  See Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 161.  
Moreover, a non-diverse plaintiff in state court would be 
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required to comply with the rule, while a plaintiff in federal 
court could avoid the certificate of merit requirement simply 
because he or she is a citizen of a different state.  The “twin 
aims” of Erie, therefore, weigh in favor of concluding that the 
Pennsylvania rule is substantive, rather than procedural.  See 
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 
C. 
 Finally, the parties have not asserted a countervailing 
federal interest nor can we conceive of any that would 
prevent the application of the Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3, 
mandating a certificate of merit in professional negligence 
claims, is substantive law under the Erie Rule and must be 
applied as such by federal courts. 
 
III. 
 We now turn to the sufficiency of the Appellant‟s 
Certificate of Merit.  The District Court and the Appellee both 
stated that the Appellant “failed” to file a Certificate of Merit.  
We disagree.  The District Court dismissed her complaint on 
that basis, relying on Fed.R.Civ.P. 41 which authorizes 
dismissal of a complaint “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or 
to comply with these rules or a court order[.]”  FED.R.CIV.P. 
41(b).
4
  Our review of the record, however, reveals that 
                                              
4
 We review a District Court's dismissal of a plaintiff's claim 
pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 41(b) for an abuse of discretion.  
Doe v. Megless, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 3250443 at *5 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 1, 2011) (citing Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 257 (3d 
Cir.2008) and Emerson,  296 F.3d at 190. 
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Liggon-Redding filed a certificate of merit in compliance 
with the Pennsylvania rules wherein she indicated that expert 
testimony of an appropriate licensed professional was 
unnecessary for the prosecution of her complaint.  See 
PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3(a)(3).   
 
 Pro se filings, such as Liggon-Redding‟s, must be 
liberally construed.  See Hartmann v. Carroll, 492 F.3d 478, 
482 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007).  Liggon-Redding filed two documents 
within the time period permitted by the District Court.  These 
filings unambiguously stated that she was proceeding under 
Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3(a)(3) by asserting that no expert 
testimony was needed to advance her claims.  The District 
Court did not address her point and, instead, characterized her 
statements as an argument that she need not file a certificate 
of merit under PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3(a)(1).  The District Court 
concluded that her claims would need expert testimony and 
rejected the position it ascribed to Liggon-Redding.  In doing 
so, the District Court abused its discretion.
5
   
                                                                                                     
    
5
 We recognize that a preliminary determination that expert 
testimony will be required in a particular case may seem to be 
an attractive option and superficially appear to serve the 
purpose of the certificate of merit requirement, which is to 
“identify and weed out non-meritorious malpractice claims 
from the judicial system efficiently and promptly.”  Womer v. 
Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 275 (Pa. 2006).  However, neither the 
rule nor Pennsylvania jurisprudence authorizes such an early 
determination.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s decision 
in Womer, for example, speaks only in terms of the 
“presence” or “absence” of a certificate, and the plain 
language of the rule permits parties to certify that no expert 
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 There is no basis in Pennsylvania law that would 
permit a district court to reject a filing under Rule 
1042.3(a)(3) in favor of one filed under Rule 1042.3(a)(1).  
Pennsylvania law expressly allows a plaintiff to proceed on 
the basis of a certification that expert testimony will not be 
required to prove her claim.  Of course, the consequence of 
such a filing is a prohibition against offering expert testimony 
later in the litigation, absent “exceptional circumstances.”  
PA.R.CIV.P. 1042.3(a)(3), Note.   A filing under this rule 
allows the case to proceed to discovery, leaving the 
consequence of Liggon-Redding‟s decision to be dealt with at 
a later stage of the litigation, such as summary judgment or 
trial.  This is the course of action the District Court should 
follow on remand. 
 
IV. 
 The District Court‟s dismissal of Liggon-Redding‟s 
complaint was clearly premature.  Hence, we will reverse the 
cause and remand this matter for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
  
 
                                                                                                     
will be required.  The federal rules likewise do not provide a 
basis for the District Court‟s actions here.  As we have 
determined, a “certificate of merit” is not a pleading.  See 
FED.R.CIV.P. 7(a); Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160 (New 
Jersey affidavit of merit not a “pleading”). 
